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Electoral Morality and the Reform of Voting Practices in Britain and France, c. 1789 ‒ 1914 
 
Eliminating electoral corruption is now an international endeavour. Since the 1980s, a 
variety of supranational organizations have sought to monitor the practice of "free and fair 
elections" around the world, among them the United Nations and the European Union.1 
Non-governmental organizations have also played a part. In 1995, for example, 
Transparency International began publishing annual statistical indexes that rank more than 
150 countries according to their relative degrees of corruption, the electoral sort included. 
Political scientists and sociologists in particular have drawn upon this unprecedented 
profusion of reports and datasets in order to detail the variable levels and types of electoral 
corruption practised in so-called “developed” and "developing democracies."2 
But what is "electoral corruption" – and when, how and why did our modern standards of 
practice emerge? For all its comprehensive comparative scope, the literature noted above is 
entirely indifferent to the multiple ways in which "corruption" has been conceived and 
practised in the past. The assumption is that today’s standards are the product of a 
progressive, modernizing movement towards electoral purity and procedural integrity. The 
corruption that persists is thus presented as a relic or reassertion of more traditional, 
coercive and pre-democratic ways of conducting elections. Conversely, the historical 
literature on the subject, though decidedly more alive to the mutability and variety of 
"corruption" as a problem, is largely confined to studies of particular states. Comparative 
accounts, attentive to both national peculiarities and commonalties of democratic 
development, as well as shifting meanings of “corruption”, remain exceptional.3 
In this article we begin the task of establishing some of the analytical co-ordinates around 
which histories of this sort might be written. We do so by comparing Britain and France, as 
they stumbled towards modern, mass forms of representative democracy during the long 
nineteenth century. This makes for a narrow survey, of course. We are also conscious of the 
connections between the two states in what was already an age of transnational emulation. 
During the 1880s and 1890s, for example, reformers in France invoked the regulations 
concerning the conduct of polling officials in the British Ballot Act of 1872. Likewise, the 
British gathered information from other European countries, including France, before 
reforming their electoral laws during the early 1880s.4 Nonetheless, as two pioneers of 
modern democracy, Britain and France provide fertile ground in which to excavate some of 
the roots of modern electoral corruption. In particular, they allow for a productive 
consideration of the ways in which electoral corruption was redefined and contested as part 
of nationally specific, if also shared, processes of democratization 
Defining "electoral corruption" 
Today, electoral corruption is but one variant of political corruption, which itself might be 
distinguished from economic and administrative (or "public office") forms. Equally, in all 
these spheres, scholars now distinguish between a number of corrupt methods, from 
bribery and fraud to extortion, blackmail and the threat of physical force.5 These 
distinctions, both of type and method, should not be taken for granted. As Bruce Buchanan 
and Lisa Hill have argued, up until the end of the eighteenth century, "corruption" was 
understood not only as the infringement of inherited customs and regulations designed to 
secure the probity of individual actions. It was also understood in more "degenerative" 
terms, as a kind of moral disease or decay that affected the functioning of society at large, 
whereby material and sectional interests subverted the virtuous pursuit of the public good. 
Individual acts of corruption were thus readily interpreted as symptoms of an underlying 
malaise in the body politic, recalling classical republican and civic humanist conceptions of 
political morality. Yet, so they suggest, beginning in the late eighteenth century, narrower, 
more procedural understandings triumphed over those of a more social sort. Corruption, 
they write, became "increasingly a matter of rules, boundaries, personal probity and 
appropriate organization."6 
The case of electoral reform in Britain and France suggests that more "degenerative" 
conceptions of corruption did not disappear quite as quickly or as completely as Buchanan 
and Hill suggest. We turn to competing conceptions below; but it also supports their 
argument, for in both countries electoral corruption assumed a sharper, more elaborate and 
procedural form as a regulatory problem – indeed, in Britain the very term “electoral 
corruption” was rare before the 1840s. Crucially, as part of the same process, anti-
corruption initiatives also helped to redefine the voter as an autonomous, individual agent. 
To corrupt a voter was to undermine his powers of self-determination and freedom of 
choice. 
In Britain, the generic term was “corrupt practices”, as evident in two key reforming 
statutes: the Corrupt Practices Acts of 1854 and 1883. This was not the first legislation that 
sought to diminish electoral malpractice, which dates back to 1696. Further acts followed 
during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, some of which demanded new oaths 
of integrity on the part of electors and returning officers.7 The legislation of the mid- to late 
Victorian period was altogether more elaborate by comparison. The 1854 Act detailed three 
types of corrupt practice, namely bribery, treating, and undue influence; and for the first 
time required the presentation of accounts relating to election costs. The 1883 Act 
tightened the regulatory framework, among other things setting strict limits on campaign 
expenses.8 Meanwhile, the British passed the 1872 Ballot Act, which rendered secret the 
act of voting in parliamentary and municipal elections. Previously, in the case of 
parliamentary elections, the votes cast by electors were declared orally to a poll clerk; in the 
case of municipal elections, voters presented their choices on ballot papers. Either way, 
they were open to the scrutiny of electoral officials, party agents, candidates and fellow 
constituents. By contrast, after 1872, these choices had to be marked anonymously on 
ballot papers, in the privacy of a polling booth, and then deposited in a ballot box. 
Preventing corruption thus became a matter of the minute regulation of millions of bits of 
paper. No detail escaped regulatory notice: each paper had to be uniform; made available 
only within polling places; marked in secret; and then counted in one place under the eyes 
of a returning officer.9 
In France, we find a similar process of growing procedural specification; and this too was 
based around securing the individual (male) elector as an independent agent, able to 
exercise the vote free from actes de corruption. As early as the revolution of 1789, voters 
were required to swear the following oath as they cast their handwritten ballot papers: “I 
swear to name [on a paper] only those whom I have consciously chosen as the most worthy 
of public office, without having been influenced by gifts, promises, requests or threats.”10 
But no penalties were prescribed for contravention, save for expulsion from the assemblies 
in which voters chose their representatives. It was only after 1848 that a comprehensive set 
of infractions and penalties was established. A law of 1849 specified a series of offences, 
from interfering with the ballot box and ballot papers (bulletins) to the bribery and 
intimidation of voters.11 Slightly modified in 1852, these measures remained in force into 
the following century, and were confirmed once more by a law in 1914, which aimed at 
“cracking down on corrupt practices.”12 Crucially, it was passed at the same time as a 
much-delayed law introducing the use of envelopes and polling booths (isoloirs), designed 
to ensure the secrecy, liberty and purity (sincérité) of the vote. As in Britain, detailed 
regulations emerged regarding the production, distribution and marking of papers and their 
insertion (unlike in Britain) in an envelope, prior to being cast in a boîte de scrutiny, or urne. 
Common conditions 
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, then, electoral corruption was gradually 
refashioned as a problem of regulatory procedure and correct organization. In short, on 
both sides of the Channel it became a matter of detailed rules and the provision of 
technologies such as ballot papers and polling booths. Clearly, the detailed codes of 
electoral purity that today function as international standards have their origins in the 
nineteenth century. How might we account for this shared descent into regulatory detail? It 
would be reckless to point to one common causal factor, or even several, given the complex 
gestation of particular reforms and their different timings in each country. The chronological 
discrepancy – more than forty years – between the advent of secure secret balloting is the 
most striking instance. Equally, it would be wrong to obscure the way the modernization of 
corruption developed as part of a broader reconfiguration of electoral culture along mass, 
representative lines. We might, that is, point to some common conditions that rendered the 
need for stringent procedural regulations more urgent, even if they did not determine the 
precise nature and timing of reform. Two processes might be highlighted. 
One of these was the development of more inclusive franchises and the corresponding need 
for measures that could order the conduct of growing numbers of electors. This occurred 
most dramatically in France, where the revolution of 1848 established universal male 
suffrage in one fell swoop, resulting in an electorate of roughly 9 million men. Previously, 
the parliamentary franchise had been limited to only 250,000 property holders. Franchise 
extension was more gradual in Britain, where a series of acts passed in 1832, 1867 and 1884 
– 1885 increased the electorate from roughly 400,000 in the 1820s to roughly 6.5 million 
adult males by the 1890s. Crucially, these acts also began the process of making Britain’s 
electoral map more uniform, and composed – as in France post-1848 – of large 
constituencies containing roughly the same number of voters. 
"Rotten boroughs", for instance, which might contain as few as fifty voters and were thus 
easily controlled by a local patron, were first targeted in 1832 and had disappeared by the 
1880s. 
In these novel conditions, the voter was both more difficult to corrupt and more difficult to 
secure as an independent agent; but either way, this process of expansion made for 
problems of discipline and organization. It is no coincidence that in both countries it was 
accompanied by measures that led to the eclipse of voting in shared public assemblies. In 
1848, the French abandoned the practice, formalized during the 1790s, of canvassing and 
voting in closed, small-scale electoral assemblies (assemblées électorales), where the ballot 
papers were composed by hand. After 1848, polling stations (bureaux de vote) became the 
norm, as did pre-prepared (often printed) ballot papers accompanied by campaigns that 
began before the day of election.13 In Britain, the most dramatic change came in 1872 with 
the introduction of secrecy; but even before this date the tradition of providing only one 
polling place for all electors in a given constituency had been eroded. Following the 1832 
Reform Act, for instance, electors were served by one polling place for every 600 or so 
voters in what were now called "polling districts." 
The second factor was growing levels of partisan organization and intensified efforts to 
canvass and cajole voters, which – much as with the expansion of the franchise – invariably 
placed pressure on inherited electoral customs, as well as any emerging regulations. From 
the 1830s British parliamentary and local elections were more frequently contested, 
commonly by Whigs, liberals and radicals (or Liberals) on the one hand, and Tories (or 
Conservatives) on the other. Partisan forms of politics also emerged in France, albeit in a 
more hesitant fashion. Although the authoritarian government of Louis-Napoleon stifled the 
development of party organization in the 1850s and 1860s, political liberalization under the 
Third Republic (1870 ‒ 1940) witnessed an intensification of pluralistic electoral 
competition.14 One consequence was a growth in the number of election results that were 
invalidated following subsequent investigations by the Chamber of Deputies into allegations 
of corruption. The French, with their tradition of two rounds of voting in search of absolute 
majorities, called this process le troisième tour; and the percentage of successful appeals 
out of the total made rose from an average of 20 under the Second Empire to 90 during the 
Third Republic.15 Like-wise, in Britain the number of MPs “unseated” following 
investigations carried out by parliament (or, after 1868, special election courts) increased 
between the 1840s and 1880s. By this measure the most corrupt general election occurred 
in 1852, when 49 petitions were submitted, twenty-five of which were upheld. The 1868 
election ranks as a close second, prompting 51 petitions and the invalidation of twenty-two 
contests.16 
Successful or otherwise, however, all could agree that contesting election results was a 
burdensome and often unduly partisan process.17 A related factor in terms of stimulating 
the search for more rigorous definitions of corruption was the growing cost of fighting 
elections. This played a greater role in Britain, where levels of partisan organization were 
more highly developed, and where parties also had to bear the administrative costs of 
elections (in France, by contrast, the cost of holding elections was borne by the state, and 
there were no additional expenses for election officials or the police). The biggest bill, 
however, was for agents, canvassers and messengers; promotional literature and 
committee rooms; and transporting voters to the polls. And these costs increased 
considerably during the mid-century, peaking in 1880, when formal party returns suggested 
the amount was £1.7 million – although contemporaries suggested the amount was more, 
perhaps as much as £2.5 million, or in today’s terms an eye-watering £120 million.18 In 
Britain, certainly, one ingredient of reform was thus the need to draw a clearer distinction 
between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” electoral expenses as a means of saving money. 
Varieties of corruption 
It is no surprise that in this context the incidence of “corrupt practices,” or “actes de 
corruption,” increased during the nineteenth century, before receding in the twentieth, 
putting aside for the moment alternative conceptions of electoral morality. On the one 
hand, we have the development of larger franchises and more regular and fiercely fought 
electoral contests; on the other, the refinement of corruption as a problem of procedure 
and correct organization. The most signal manifestation of the role of these two factors is 
the unprecedented production of writing and commentary on the problem. In France, 
bulging dossiers of evidence were submitted to the Chamber of Deputies, containing 
testimonies from candidates and dozens of witnesses. In Britain, too, the amount of 
information gathered was enormous: the investigation into the contest at Hull in 1853 
amassed no less than 2,000 pages of printed testimony; the one for Bridgwater in 1870 
generated just over one thousand. Never before had “corruption” been put into discourse 
with such intensity or regularity. 
This is not to exhaust the common contextual factors that might be offered. Other scholars 
have pointed to the following: the gradual erosion of cultures of deference; increases in real 
wages, which made bribery less attractive to voters; and the flourishing of print-based forms 
of political communication, in particular newspapers, which sapped the need for more 
direct, face-to-face forms of canvassing and electioneering.19 Yet the causal significance of 
these factors is still more difficult to specify precisely, given their generality and hugely 
variable realization in different places in Britain and France. In any case, the persistence and 
vibrancy of forms of electoral corruption suggest they were of less importance than the two 
highlighted above. 
What, then, of the different forms of corruption that were the subject of intensified 
exposure? There is no shortage of national peculiarities. Whereas the British were especially 
preoccupied with the escalating cost of elections, the French were particularly concerned 
with so-called “official corruption”. This was partly facilitated by the central appointment of 
local officials, most of all prefects (préfets) and sub-prefects, who presided over the 
départements into which France was divided, something absent in Britain. In the case of the 
Second Empire, when official candidatures were openly practised, some commentators have 
questioned whether it should count as corruption, precisely because of its official status; but 
inducements and intimidation were frequently practised, including threatening officials with 
dismissal if they refused to endorse or cooperate with the regime.20 Although often 
exaggerated, the problem of ecclesiastical involvement on the part of Catholic clergy is also 
specific to France, where priests were paid by the state until 1905 and the place of religion 
in society was a constant issue.21 What the French called l’ingérence clericale (clerical 
meddling) assumed various forms, from bishops using pastoral letters to promote particular 
candidates to parish clergy threatening hellfire and damnation from the pulpit to the same 
end. 
Nonetheless, three common types of corruption might be highlighted. One of these is what 
the English called “treating,” the French rastels, something that was part of the festive 
nature of elections in both countries. In Britain, as in France, pubs (or bars) often served as 
the organizing centres of local campaigns, and it was quite natural for publicans (or bar 
tenders) to provide support with free drink and food, and then charge the candidates 
afterwards. It is difficult to dissociate this from a broader culture of hospitality that would 
briefly erupt during election time, whereby electors would expect at least modicum of 
largesse from those seeking their votes. In Gloucester, in 1859, for instance, the “machinery 
of corruption,” as one investigation put it, included Tory and Liberal party agents 
distributing drink to supporters, and lavishing funds on those who acted as messengers, 
flag-bearers and bandsmen; or what was known as “colourable employment.”22 Analogous 
practices were employed in France. In 1904, one unusually literate – and republican – 
Breton peasant recalled the practices employed during the bitterly fought election of 1877, 
when the infant Third Republic was still threatened by monarchists and Catholics. “The 
Jesuits and clericals, although confident of winning, nevertheless thought it worthwhile to 
draw in the peasants and workers any way they could,” he detailed. “They sent their agents 
out into the countryside, pockets stuffed with hundred-sou coins, to spread readymade 
speeches and patter, brochures and newspapers, and cigars and guin ardent [brandy].”23 
He noted, too, how the local nobleman (châtelain) had treated his tenant farmers “to all 
they could eat and drink” the night before the election, whilst encouraging them to vote for 
the conservative candidate. 
A second form of corruption that might be highlighted is direct bribery or vote-buying. In 
France, modest sums of money changed hands in bars, where ballot papers were checked 
before voters took them to the polling stations, or outside the stations, where coins might 
be given to voters in the course of a handshake. In Britain this assumed various forms and 
the sums of money might be considerable. During a contest held in 1826 in the market town 
of Stafford, for instance, votes changed hands for no less than £14 as the contest drew to a 
close (or roughly £500 today).24 As in France, this was done discreetly and normally in pubs 
or on doorsteps; but this did not preclude the use of more ingenious methods. A splendid 
example is furnished by the parliamentary election that took place in the Yorkshire town of 
Beverley in 1865. Here the bribes were distributed in the library of the local Mechanics’ Hall. 
The voters were called in according to a register prepared on the basis of canvassing, and 
then given their payment via a small hole in the library door, thereby shielding the face of 
the person distributing the money.25 At the cost of between £1 and £4 each, some 400 
votes for the Liberal candidate were secured in this way, amounting to about 80 per cent of 
the total support he received. 
A third facet of what came to be regarded as electoral corruption is intimidation, or what 
the British distinguished as “undue influence.”  Some of this was of physical sort. In Britain 
there are occasional reports of voters being forcibly kidnapped, plied with alcohol, and then 
marched to the polls, something known as “bottling.” In France in 1848, when rural voters 
had to travel to the chef-lieu de canton (unlike later when voting took place in each village), 
gangs would be waiting on the roads into town and would ask to see ballot papers, before 
tearing them up and replacing them if they did not meet with their approval. Similarly crude 
tactics were still being employed at the end of century: in 1893, at Brive in the south-west, 
there are reports of a band of hoodlums called the Mamelouks breaking up election 
meetings and physically threatening supporters of the conservative candidate.26 More 
common, however, were threats that entailed a financial penalty of some sort. The pattern 
is the same in both countries. In general, intimidation by employers prevailed in urban 
areas, where it normally involved the threat of dismissal. These were not empty threats: in 
1868, a mill owner from Ashton-under-Lyne, near Manchester, dismissed forty of his 
employees who had disobeyed his instruction to vote for the Liberal candidate.27 By 
contrast, in rural areas, intimidation was principally exercised by landlords, where it centred 
on the possibility of eviction.  
What is "corruption"? 
Certainly, the distinctions made between “pure” and “corrupt” elections became more 
pronounced during the nineteenth century, and it is tempting to regard the above practices 
as outdated relics of a “pre-modern” past. Similarly, we might interpret such practices as the 
work of power-hungry political elites seeking to manipulate the electorate in any way they 
could, other than through rational persuasion and an appeal to matters of political principle. 
To do so, however, is to obscure the way notions of electoral “legitimacy” were variously 
understood at the time, and not just by those seeking office. Put another way – and to 
complicate the account of Buchanan and Hill noted above – we need to recognise the 
patchy and contested ascendancy of more procedural definitions of “corruption.” If 
anything, it is the twentieth century, rather than the nineteenth, that marks the critical 
watershed in this respect. 
One aspect of this is the sense of legitimacy that continued to surround established 
practices. This applied across the gamut of actes de corruption, including direct bribery. In 
the 1850s, for instance, it was suggested that “scores of free-men” in the British portside 
town of Hull regarded exchanging votes for cash as a “sort of birth-right.”28 The terms that 
were used are telling. As one party agent explained in 1870, speaking of practices in 
Beverley noted above: “We do not call it bribery. It is the old customary payment.”29 
Treating in particular was judged legitimate long into the nineteenth century. For some, of 
course, this was but another corrupt electioneering tactic; but it was also understood as the 
means via which candidates demonstrated their fitness for office, which is to say, their 
sense of duty towards the community and capacity for noblesse oblige. As one French 
government official noted of the Côtes-du-Nord in 1878: “In this region it is part of the way 
of life that voters should be plied with cider and cigars. They regard it as their right and an 
obligation upon the candidate,” adding that “these practices escape prosecution because 
the majority of voters are involved.”30 Likewise, what some condemned as “intimidation” 
and “undue influence” was for others quite harmless, and even edifying. The one-time 
prime minister, Robert Peel, captured existing elite attitudes when, in a parliamentary 
debate on secret balloting, he sought to defend landlords from the charge that they acted 
like “tyrants” during elections. “The influence they exercise,” he suggested, “is not so much 
intimidation, as the natural and legitimate influence which is almost inseparable from the 
relation of landlord to tenant.”31 It was, in other words, the benign expression of the power 
and responsibility that attended the ownership of property. 
This much is to be expected, perhaps. Old habits die hard, and in both countries hierarchical 
conceptions of society were only slowly displaced, especially in rural areas (and France 
remained a predominantly rural nation until the interwar period). The picture is further 
complicated, however – and in more unexpected ways – by conceptions of corruption that 
centred on a series of institutions and practices that are now accepted as a key part of our 
own electoral modernity and a culture of “free and fair” elections. In France, for instance, 
political parties and partisan electioneering were regarded with suspicion, recalling classical 
and humanist anxieties concerning the development of “factions” and the corruption of the 
unity and virtue of the body politic. During the 1790s any sort of canvassing or campaigning 
was regarded as illegitimate and denigrated as a form “intrigue” that interfered with a 
voter’s independence, in turn tainting the pure expression of the “general will.”32 Likewise, 
during the elections of 1849 and those under the Second Empire, the use of campaign 
committees was denounced by conservatives and republicans alike as corrupt. Committees, 
it was suggested, advanced narrow, sectional interests and were thus an affront to a 
political culture that was supposed to be about transcending these kinds of division.33 To be 
sure, this did little to diminish partisan efforts to engage electors; but it is striking that it was 
not until 1889 when a law was passed requiring the formal declaration of candidatures. 
Degenerative conceptions were also in play in Britain, where it was voting in secret, rather 
than the existence of parties, that aroused the most anxiety. In particular, they formed the 
basis of arguments which suggested that secret voting was unmanly, deceitful, and would 
ultimately undermine an elector’s sense of the public good. Honour and virtue were at 
stake. “An abominable tyranny is exercised by the ballot,” wrote the Whig churchman, 
Sydney Smith, in 1839 in one of the most quoted anti-ballot texts of the time: “it compels 
those persons to conceal their votes who hate all concealment, and who glory in the cause 
they support … you make me, who am bold and honest, sneak in at the back door as well as 
yourself.”34 This is not to deny that open voting facilitated bribery and intimidation; but the 
idea that the secret ballot was a technology of electoral purity was a moot point – or rather, 
a matter of perspective and what one understood by “corruption”. Another much-quoted 
critic was the radical liberal J. S. Mill, whose arguments recalled, quite directly, classical 
conceptions of political morality: “Disguise in all its forms is a badge of slavery,” he wrote in 
1859: “People will give dishonest or mean votes from lucre and from the interests or 
prejudices of class or sect, far more readily in secret than in public.”35 Or as he put it in his 
Considerations on Representative Government, secret voting would “nourish in him [the 
voter] the disposition to use a public function [the vote] for his own interests, pleasure or 
caprice; the same feelings … which actuate a despot.”36 
This is not to draw precise parallels between opposition to political parties in France and 
opposition to secret balloting in Britain. The former was more about the culture of elections, 
the latter the physical expression of the franchise. Even so, there are definite analogies. In 
particular, they shared the premise that corruption is not just a matter of procedure, or of 
protecting the individual per se, but of the overall integrity of public life and somehow 
minimizing the destructive role of private and sectional interests. Ultimately, as Buchanan 
and Hill suggest, it was the rise of capitalism and utilitarian reappraisals of economic self-
interest – to which we might add the growing legitimacy of sectional, class-based political 
forms such as workers’ parties and trade unions – that served to render degenerative 
conceptions of political corruption truly anachronistic; but they were not yet out of place in 
the nineteenth century, when what is most striking is the sheer range of conceptions of 
corruption and illegitimate electoral practice. It is not just that there were various answers 
to the question “what is electoral corruption?” The question itself was posed in different 
ways.  
Conclusion 
The above essay has sought to provide only a sketch of how comparative histories of 
electoral corruption might be developed. It does not pretend to have offered anything like a 
full account; and it could be other countries suggest a different framework based around 
alternative dynamics and forms of corruption. Nonetheless, enough ground has been 
covered to demonstrate that modern, procedural conceptions of electoral corruption 
developed in a thoroughly contingent, contested and confused fashion. To be sure, in Britain 
the key reforms followed hard on the heels of what were perceived to be unusually corrupt 
elections (in 1853, 1868, and 1880), but there was no grand plan or smooth, linear 
trajectory of development at work. In France, likewise, early attempts at regulation were 
prompted by the sudden advent of universal male suffrage in 1848, but reform then stalled 
until the first decade of the twentieth century, when the Commission on Universal Suffrage, 
created in 1898, helped to bring earlier proposals to fruition. In both cases, legislation 
emerged in an ad hoc fashion; norms of behaviour changed only slowly; and various factors 
were in play. Reform was not solely a matter of realizing novel, purer ideals. Just as 
important were the organizational challenges generated by the advent of larger electorates 
and more frequent and partisan elections. 
Crucially, this can help us to challenge accounts – especially prevalent in the political and 
social sciences – which suggest that electoral corruption should be seen as a brake on 
processes of democratization, as something alien and exterior, and as a tenacious relic of a 
pre-modern, traditional past. Instead, we might view modern understandings of electoral 
corruption as a product of democratization. This is not to endorse past or present forms of 
electoral malpractice; rather, it is simply to insist that electoral corruption changed its 
meaning and was forged anew as an integral part of processes of democratic development. 
Ultimately, "electoral corruption" is just as much a contingent, mutable product of history as 
"democracy" itself. 
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